The annual production of hazardous wastes which was less than 10 million metric tonnes in the 1940s is now in excess of 320 million metric tonnes. These wastes are, in the main, by-products of industrial processes that have contributed significantly to the economic development of many countries which, in turn, has led to lifestyles that also generate hazardous wastes. The phenomenal increase in the generation of hazardous wastes coupled with various barriers to local disposal has led to the thriving international (...) trade in these environmentally hazardous substances. This paper examines the nature of the international trade in hazardous wastes and the ethical issues associated with such business activity. (shrink)

V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Ontology was never Hume's main interest, but he certainly had opinions as to what there is, and he often expressed these in his philosophical works. Indeed it seems clear that Hume changed his ontological views while writing the Treatise, and that not just one but two different ontologies are to be found there. The ontology of Parts I, II, and III of Book I is more or less Lockean. There are minds and their operations and qualities. There are physical entities, (...) bodily actions and qualities if not bodies over and above these. And there are further entities, called ideas by Locke and perceptions by Hume, that represent things other than themselves, both physical and mental, while existing in and being dependent upon minds. In Part IV of Book I, however, and especially in Sections 2 and 6, a new ontology appears, one that differs not only from the doctrine of the earlier sections of the Treatise but also from any that previous philosophers had held. According to this new ontology, there are only perceptions: all other sorts of things are absorbed by or reduced to these, or else simply eliminated. Berkeley had indeed assimilated bodies and the properties of bodies to perceptions, but he had kept minds as a distinct category of entity. Hume went the whole way, making everything perceptions. We might characterise this new ontology as trans-Berkeleyan, or call it, on account of its similarity to later doctrines so named, phenomenalism or neutral monism. (shrink)

I do not think it would be fair for me to reply to Professor Spiegelberg’s rejoinder without giving him the chance to reply in turn to my reply. The first speaker in a symposium should always, I believe, have the last word. But by that principle I am entitled to a reply to Professor Chisholm, for whom, in his original paper, I was a primary target.

A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second Critique, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography.--V. C. C.

Attention has been drawn, particularly since Kant, to propositions which can not have negative instances. They used to be called a priori, axioms, first principles. Today, they are usually called postulates—C. I. Lewis uses both the old and new terminology—because there is a growing recognition of the fact that at least some of them are not “necessary” in the traditional sense. Kant placed a limitation on the apriorism of the continental rationalists. Current epistemologists and logicians have outstripped Kant in the (...) direction signalled by him. Both he and they, however, concur in the opinion that apriori propositions are subject to negation of a sort. The Kantian dinge-an-sich, though they can not contradict these propositions by being negative instances of them, do nevertheless stand to them in the relation of insubordination, thereby exerting on them a “negative action” of a sort. And, according to current views, there are instances which, though they fall outside the range of significance of a proposition or system and hence can not contradict it, do nevertheless tend to bring about a revision of it by a negative action of some sort. The purpose of this brief essay is to coin a convenient name for such instances and to describe certain properties of their peculiar negative action. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that scholars such as John Braithwaite and Lode Walgrave rely on fictions when presenting their utopian vision of restorative justice. Three claims in particular are shown to be fictitious. Proponents of restorative justice maintain, first, that the offender and the victim voluntarily attend the restorative conference. Second, that the restorative conference enables the offender and the victim to take on active responsibility. Third, that the reparatory tasks on which the parties agree should not be understood (...) in terms of the intentional infliction of harm. These fictions, so I argue, are not merely a mistake, but instead serve an important function: the various parties need to believe that they adequately capture the reality of the restorative conference as they are more likely to acquiesce if they believe the fictions to be true. I conclude that the fictions are the driving force within the restorative endeavour. (shrink)

Reprints a useful, non-technical statement of Reichenbach's mature thought, combining an unconvincing survey of speculative philosophy and its "failure," with a concise account of the results of a philosophy carried out "scientifically." The original appeared in 1951.--V. C. C.

This well designed anthology is a paperback, but not a reprint. Often sizable chunks from the works of nine writers and philosophers are included, and Mr. Kaufmann ties them all together in a series of pithy prefaces. Some of the selections are well known; others--e.g., Jaspers' "On My Philosophy" --appear here for the first time in English, in translations by the editor and others. Mr. Kaufmann's lively introduction attempts to characterize existentialism as a whole, and to place its various representatives (...) in relation to each other; it does both nicely. The volume as a whole, in fact, is a first-rate introduction to existentialism.--V. C. C. (shrink)

A warm and sympathetic reconstruction, by an obvious admirer, of the life, times and work of K'ung Ch'iu, based upon the Confucian Classics and a variety of historical sources, including the works of recent scholars. A helpful bibliography is included.--V. C. C.

The second installment of Dr. Needham's epic venture into the intellectual history of ancient and medieval China. The work's general emphasis is upon science and technology; the present volume expounds the teachings of the main philosophical systems and schools--Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, etc.--and describes their bearing upon the scientific thinking of their times. The detail with which these accounts are carried out is staggering, yet the narrative line remains clear. The work's scope, too, is incredible, as Dr. Needham delves fully into (...) the backgrounds, social, cultural, and intellectual, of the various systems of thought. Full references to sources and complementary accounts, frank acknowledgment of the disputedness of certain interpretations, and the provision of the Chinese characters for key terms, increase the work's value for scholars. Certainly this is a monumental achievement, however the details be judged by the experts. The volume is beautifully produced, with tables and many fine illustrations.--V. C. C. (shrink)

An extended polemic, couched in familiar and fairly naive terms, against "faith, myth and superstition." Chance, the author argues, and the physical processes of which it is the dominant feature, form "the guiding principle for our lives."--V. C. C.

An unabridged republication of the Elwes translation of Spinoza's works, made in 1883, but still highly regarded for its accuracy and lucidity. The present edition, compact and yet clearly presented, includes a bibliographical note by Francesco Cordasco.--V. C. C.

Five essays, all of them previously published in English but here brought together for the first time, consisting of delightfully overstated--and therefore highly stimulating--observations on art and letters.--V. C. C.

The main object of this impressive study is to lay the groundwork, in contemporary terms, for a systematic and philosophically respectable "apology for poetry." The author finds that most of the so-called New Critics agree in rejecting both the "sugar-coated pill" and "l'art pour l'art" views of poetry; their efforts to formulate a workable third view form the basis for his elaboration of the requirements of an acceptable theory, one which will accord with--and do justice to--the unique and irreducible aesthetic (...) experience to which poetry gives rise. The details of such a theory, unfortunately, are never made entirely clear, owing in part to the diverse and often conflicting demands which must be met, but its main points are as follows: poems, though mainly self-contained, their meanings determined contextually rather than referentially, yet "reveal life," "illuminate human experience"; in poetic creation, though the poet's intentions somehow control the outcome, yet the language of the evolving poem itself determines its own final nature; and poetry, though it neither merely instructs or informs nor merely pleases, yet does provide a kind of "truth" and does produce an experience in some sense pleasurable. The strength of Mr. Krieger's study lies in the clarity and force with which he states the various issues, and in the scholarly care with which he examines the views of individual critics. The book, however, lacks tight organization and sustained, clearly directed argumentation, and its final outcome is rather inconclusive.--V. C. C. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is purely expository, but within its limits it is perhaps the best account of existentialism yet to appear in English. Its virtues are clarity, balance, accuracy, and an objectivity of tone which is maintained even in the treatment of emotionally charged subject-matter. Mr. Grimsley summarizes the views of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, and Marcel in separate chapters of fairly extensive scope, mainly through direct exposition of their major works. In a short introduction, and again in (...) a shorter postscript, he attempts to characterize existentialism and the existential attitude as a whole; his success makes one wish he had done more in this direction.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Baudelaire's art criticism in a generous paperback sampling. Included are reviews of the salons of 1845, 1846 and 1869, the essay "On the Essence of Laughter," and a study of Delacroix. Many of the art works mentioned in the text are pictured in the volume's 64 pages of illustrations.--V. C. C.

A welcome addition to the series of translation-commentaries initiated by the late F. M. Cornford. Mr. Bluck's English Phaedo reads smoothly and naturally; it is, like the original, a work of literature as well as of philosophy. The running commentary is clear, well-informed and helpful, being mainly designed to get the reader through the text. More detailed pieces of analysis and interpretation are placed in an Appendix; here Mr. Bluck argues that Plato's Forms are not merely abstract logical universals, but (...) substantial "things," which "cause" the appearances in the material world. He also defends, in opposition to the majority view, the validity of the crucial proof of the soul's indestructibility at 105E ff.--V. C. C. (shrink)